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Steven Pinker is a professor in the Department of  Brain and 
Cognitive Sciences at MIT, and in 1994 will become director of 
its McDonnell-Pew Center for Cognitive Neuroscience. He re- 
ceived his B.k from McGill University in  1976 and his Ph.D. 
from Harvard  University in  1979, both in  experimental psy- 
chology, and taught at Harvard and Stanford before joining the 
faculty of  MIT in 1982. He has done research in visual cognition 
and the psychology of  language, and is the author of  Language 
harnubility and Language Development (1984)  and ,%?am- 
ability and Cognition (1989) and the editor of  Visual Cognition 
JOCN  You  have written a new book about the nature 
of  human language for a general audience. Tell us what 
you want to communicate in The Lunguuge Instinct? 
SP: The book  is about all aspects of  human language. 
One thing  I  wanted to  do was  to answer the kinds of 
questions I get asked when I tell people I study language, 
such as, are there really pockets of  the Ozarks where 
people speak Elizabethan English?  What language would 
a child speak if  he was raised by  wolves? What’s  going 
on when religious people “speak in tongues?”  Why can’t 
computers take dictation? Why  does no  one know the 
plural  of  “Walkman”? Why  is  English  spelling  so  de- 
ranged?  What’s the scoop about the search for the mother 
of  all languages? 
But  my  main goal  was to  try to  unify the study of 
language under a key idea: that language is an evolution- 
ary adaptation, like echolocation in bats or the elephant’s 
trunk. This may seem like a boring observation, but it 
buys a lot. It allows for a vertically integrated science of 
language, where everything from genes and neural net- 
works to Orwell and dudespeak can be fit into a consis- 
tent framework. And a lot of  controversies just disappear, 
such as whether syntactic form or semantic function is 
more important, or whether there would be some evo- 
lutionary paradox if humans turned out to be the only 
species with language. After all, no one gets upset at the 
idea  that  the  elephant’s trunk  is  both  structured  and 
useful, or that it is complex but found in only one spe- 
cies. 
Also, treating language as a biological adaptation over- 
turns many folk theories that pervade modern intellec- 
tual  life. The  books  on language that you will  find at 
your local B. Dalton all treat language as some obscure 
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body of  lore, like how to use “hopefully” correctly or 
the correct term for a collection of  larks, something that 
has to be  carefully passed  on by  English teachers and 
“language mavens” (who are mostly quacks, by the way). 
I try to show that the complexity of  language really comes 
from the minds of  ordinary children and Joe Six-packs; 
the rules of  the schoolmarm are just minor little deco- 
rations. Also, the general picture of  the human mind that 
you  find in books and magazines-basically  the blank 
slate, together with the concession that of  course heredity 
and environment are inseparably interconnectedly inter- 
twiningly intermingled-turns  out to be woefully lame. 
I think that with what we now know about language, we 
can do better. 
JOCN Well some might read you as saying that language 
is innate and Chomsky made that point in 1959 with his 
review of  Skinner’s “Verbal Behavior.” Before going into 
details, how does your MIT view differ from other MIT 
views? 
SP: Obviously, some of  the key ideas in the book come 
from  Chomsky-that  there  is  an innate  neural  system 
dedicated to  language; that  his system uses a  discrete 
combinatorial code, or grammar, to map between sound 
and meaning; that this code manipulates data structures 
that are dedicated to language and not reducible to per- 
ception, articulation, or concepts. But there are  also some 
differences in style and substance. Chomsky‘s arguments 
for the innateness of  language are based  on technical 
analyses of  word and sentence structure, together with 
some perfunctory  remarks on universality and acquisi- 
tion. I think converging evidence is crucial, and try to 
summarize the facts on children’s development, cross- 
linguistic surveys, genetic language disorders, and so on. 
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Miller  and Eric Lenneberg than Chomsky. And  there is 
one substantive difference: I argue that language is  an 
adaptation, a product of natural selection, and hence has 
parts that are designed for specific functions involved in 
communication. Chomsky  is  agnostic-to-hostile about 
natural selection and  its applicability to  language. He 
suspects that the language faculty could have come about 
as an accidental product of  the way  the laws of  physics 
act on the developing brain. He has even suggested that 
grammar appears to have been designed for beauty, not 
for usefulness. 
JOCN  Is that a way of  saying that Chomsky has not really 
thought about how language could have developed from 
a biological (evolutionary) point of view? It would seem 
he simply observed it must be established through ge- 
netic mechanisms and moved on to other matters. 
SP: The vast  majority of  cognitive scientists and neuro- 
scientists have not really thought about the evolution of 
the brain, but I don’t think that is true of  Chomsky; he 
has thought about evolution a great deal. But he is  not 
familiar with mainstream evolutionary biology. His views 
are more in  the tradition of  the many physicists who 
suspect that the theory of  natural selection is somehow 
vacuous and circular, or that the mechanism is too klugey 
and  random  to  create  interesting biological  systems. 
Their esthetic is that biological structures should some- 
how follow deductively  from general laws and principles, 
like the growth of  crystals. 
JOCN:  Evolutionary theory does suggest the brain is a 
kluge, a collection of  ad hoc systems that somehow get 
the job done. Does your account of  language, driven as 
it is from an evolutionary perspective, document and/or 
identify various language operations as a collection of 
adaptations that has accumulated over time?  Chomskyans 
talk about the language organ as an entity that suddenly 
appears on the scene (in the brain). Does your analysis 
suggest this first approximation is insufficient in light of 
what is now known about language organization? 
SP: The point about biological systems being collections 
of  kluges has been a bit overdone by psychologists. If 
you look at many biological systems you see astoundingly 
sophisticated engineering, the eye being the most famous 
example, but with  a few kluges (like the retina being 
installed backward) that reveal their origin as the result 
of  selection of  random small changes from an ancestral 
form. I  think in  language we certainly see signs of  en- 
gineering to carry out a function. Syntax and morphology 
are codes that map multidimensional semantic data struc- 
tures onto strings of  symbols that  can be transmitted 
through a serial interface. Phonology allows a finite num- 
ber of  sound units to  be rearranged to form an open- 
ended set of  words, and phonetics compresses the units 
into a signal that transmits them at  a rate that exceeds 
the resolving power of  the ear. 
And,  as you  would  expect, there  are  oddities and 
quirks that  suggest that language was  not designed de- 
liberately or from scratch. The  descended larynx is the 
obvious physiological example (good for making speech 
sounds at the cost of making us more likely to choke on 
food). At  the computational level, you find examples of 
seemingly needless redundancy, like the fact that certain 
information can be conveyed either by rote memorizing 
lexical items or by composing structures with grammat- 
ical  rules, giving us the  contrast between  regular and 
irregular forms (take-took versus bake-baked) and the 
resulting grammatical mayhem. The verb and preposition 
system seem to have been designed to  convey spatial 
and force-dynamic information, so we have to resort to 
motion metaphors when talking about abstract informa- 
tion such as state changes (e.g., Sam went jbm  being 
sick to being well).  And no one knows how to talk about 
something  possessed  by  two  people  (Rob  and  my 
mother? Rob and  me’s mother? Rob’s and my mother?). 
Regarding language appearing  all  at  once1  don’t 
think Chomsky has made that claim, though Derek Bick- 
erton  has  suggested that  it  appeared  in  two  stages. It 
strikes me as unlikely, for standard evolutionary reasons. 
If  language is a complex system involving many finely 
interacting parts that collectively do something interest- 
ing (as Chomsky himself has shown) then by the laws of 
probability you would not expect one random mutation 
to  give  some  fortunate ancestor  all  of  the  necessary 
neural modifications in  one thunderclap.  I  also think 
there is  evidence from neuroscience and genetics that 
speaks against language emerging as an automatic phys- 
ical by-product of  some more global development such 
as a large brain (which is  something Chomsky has con- 
jectured  as a possibility). Across  normal  variation and 
pathology you  see big differences in brain size, shape, 
and global organization that can coexist with intact lan- 
guage. This suggests that  it  is a  certain wiring of  the 
microcircuitry that is essential. Also, in cases of  geneti- 
cally transmitted specific language impairment, you don’t 
find language wiped out entirely, but different compo- 
nents affected to different extents. If  a single lucky ge- 
netic change had given us language,  it should be possible 
for a mutation in that gene to wipe language out entirely, 
but one never sees that. 
JOCN:  Hmm, sounds like a good topic for someone 
working on gene knockout to consider. But let’s switch 
gears. Sitting majestically on  the other side of  the biologic 
interpretation of  language acquisition are those that feel 
language is learned and built up through associations. 
Even  though Chomsky seemed to have devoured Skin- 
ner’s early analysis of  language along these lines, there 
are modern reincarnations of  the environmentalist  views. 
Neurocomputationalists have any number of  algorithms 
that they feel can learn and handle language learning. 
Ever since Rosenberg and Sejnowski demonstrated that 
a simple neural net could read, the field has blossomed 
with claims. How do you see it? 
SP: I  feel  that  a  lot  of  the work  in  artificial “neural 
networks” is based more on eighteenth-century notions 
pinker  93 of  learning-mainly  associative pairing and generaliza- 
tion by similarity-than  on any systematic empirical study 
of what organisms’  brains are computing. Randy Gallistel 
has made this point in reviewing the remarkable com- 
putational abilities of  various animals in  domains such 
as navigation and the perception of  time and number, 
none of  which has any need for the classical associative 
bond. I think his critique carries over to  language (be- 
cause I think psycholinguistics is a branch of  ethology). 
I don’t think the interesting issue is whether such-and- 
such a class of  model is capable of  learning X given a 
suitable training regimen. That’s a mathematical point, 
not a scientific one, and there is a consensus that most 
of  the commonly discussed artificial neural networks can 
be designed either with Turing power or as universal 
function approximators. The  interesting question is em- 
pirical: how, in fact, does the neural circuitry underlying 
language (or any other mental ability) work? To answer 
that  you  can’t just  wire  up  any  old  model, train  the 
daylights out of it, and declare victory; you have to check 
if the wiring diagram really corresponds to the plausible 
innate organization of  the  creature, and whether  the 
training  schedule plausibly  corresponds to  its  experi- 
ence. In many of  the connectionist models of  language, 
neither is done. Just take the various reading-aloud  mod- 
els, where the designer wires together a network de- 
signed to  map from visual symbols to  phonology, and 
the network has to  learn the exact mapping. Taken lit- 
erally, this is  a claim that we are innately designed to 
read-the  very ability where we are 100% sure that there 
can be no innate faculty! Similarly, neural net modelers 
have no compunctions about building in innate wiring 
to perform artificial tasks of  the late twentieth-century 
experimental psychologist, like lexical decision. The  is- 
sue is  not whether there is learning or innate wiring- 
obviously there’s both. The issue is  what  in  fact  Is the 
innate wiring and learning experience. 
This  is  especially clear to me in  my  own empirical 
work, on the linguistic computation we do  when creating 
past tense forms such as  faxed or hke.  In 1986 Rumel- 
hart and McClelland published a brilliant study of  how a 
simple feedforward network learns these mappings. Alan 
Prince and I noted a number of ways in which the model 
behaved systematically differently from people. Many in- 
volved  linguistic quirks such as the fact that people can 
easily inflect weird-sounding verbs such as to out-Gor- 
bacha:  that wring and ring are homophonous but have 
different past tense forms (and so the input to the past 
tense  system  cannot be sound alone), and that  verbs 
formed from nouns and adjectives, such asflied out to 
centerfield and ringed the  city, always take regular -ed 
even if homophonous with an irregular verb. 
The response of  many connectionists to our critique 
(not Rumelhart and McClelland themselves) was to “im- 
prove” the model by  adding hacks designed to  handle 
each one of  these quirks and train the improved model 
with  the  crucial examples-amounting  to  the  bizarre 
claim that the brain is specifically wired, and children 
are specifically taught, in  such a way  as to  make the 
quirks come about! This was  all meant to  show that a 
connectionist model can, in principle, handle the phe- 
nomena, but that was never our dispute. Our point was 
that these quirks are by-products of  some fundamental 
ways in which the language system is organized, and that 
any model of  how language is implemented in the brain 
will have to  reflect that organization. In  particular, we 
showed that the past tense computation requires at least 
three things: a division into subsystems (most fundamen- 
tally,  the mental dictionary and the  mental grammar); 
some way of  representing the identity of  entities as dis- 
tinct individuals, independent of  their phonological and 
semantic content; and a computational operation that can 
concatenate variables, not just analogize. These are not 
particularly extravagant claims, and one can imagine all 
kinds of  neural networks that can implement them. But 
the standard model of  a single associative network has 
become such doctrine that people will go to any lengths 
to maintain it, even if  it involves innately wiring in  pe- 
culiarities of  English grammar and sticking exotic cases 
into the training set. 
JOCN:  By yanking language learning out of  the field of 
learning mechanisms and marking it down as one of  our 
instincts, don’t you  sort of  also trumpet the end of  its 
study?  After all, sex is an instinct and while people study 
the physiological basis for aspects of  sex such as arousal, 
there is  not much more to say about it.  In short, once 
the descriptive work is done, and the rules are written 
for biologically based grammar, can’t you go fishing? 
SP: No,  I  would  disagree with  all  those assumptions, 
starting with sex. There is plenty to say about the cog- 
nitive psychology of  sex, as shown in the work of  evo- 
lutionary psychologists such as Don Symons, David Buss, 
Margo  Wilson, and  Martin  Daly.  The  sexual “instinct” 
surely  involves  many  complex information-processing 
mechanisms-the  psychophysics of  sexual attractiveness, 
short-term and long-term strategies for  courtship and 
manipulation and for evaluating and resisting such tac- 
tics, and decision rules for commitment versus desertion. 
And  many of  these mechanisms are surely specific to the 
domain of  sex, not social relations in general-as  Fran 
Lebowitz said, you would never choose someone as a 
close friend because he had a really cute nose. 
One of  the achievements of  linguistics is to show that 
even if a language instinct is innate, that does not mean 
that we announce that language belongs to the physiol- 
ogists and leave it at that. There is a huge body of  ongoing 
research showing how detailed facts of  English fall out 
of  the computational organization of  the mental grammar 
for  English, and how the mental grammar for English 
falls out of  the  universal grammar underlying all  lan- 
guages. But  this  is  technical, somewhat difficult work, 
and  many  psychologists  find  their  eyes  glazing over 
when, say, Chomsky starts going on about John 13 too 
stubborn fm  anyone to talk! to. They read the first and 
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about innateness, skip the actual content, and then dimly 
remember  the  claims in a  bumper-sticker form (“lan- 
guage is innate”) that seems to leave no room for anyone 
but the physiologists. 
More generally,  it’s wrong  to  equate  “instinct” and 
“physiology”  (or “innateness” and “wiring”). Neural tis- 
sue, at the level at which a physiologist studies it, is not 
going to do anything that corresponds directly to  inter- 
esting psychology. That is, you  might discover that the 
geometry  of  a  dendrite  or  the strength of  a  synapse 
functions in some way that corresponds to a logic gate 
or a paired association, but it’s not going to correspond 
to the  image of  a  sexy  mate  or the constituents  of  a 
prepositional phrase. I believe in the fairly standard view 
that cognitive abilities consist of some sequence or net- 
work of  more elementary information processes, and that 
the elementary information processes are the kinds of 
things that neurons and simple neural nets can do-that 
is the level where a cognitive scientist might hand the 
baton to the physiologist and go fishing. But most im- 
portant, this hierarchical explanation is needed whether 
an ability is learned or innate, just as the same sequence 
of  instructions can either be programmed into a com- 
puter’s memory by the user or burned into a ROM at the 
factory (a crude analogy, I know). 
JOCN  In your book you constantly argue from concrete, 
almost home-spun everyday examples from ordinary lan- 
guage use to make strong arguments for the genetic basis 
of  language. Could you speak for a moment about the 
study of  linguistics and how it  approaches a  problem 
empirically so as to allow the use of  those examples? 
SP: Actually,  both  in  the book  and  in  my  day-to-day 
research,  I  try  to get  data  of  very  different  kinds to 
converge before  concluding anything. The  most  com- 
monly  used  data  in  linguistics  are  judgments  about 
whether  some word or sentence sounds natural  to a 
speaker of  the language, and what the  speaker takes it 
to  mean. It’s a kind of  psychophysics done on oneself 
and  one’s readers,  a  lot  like  a  demonstration  that  a 
Necker cube flips or that isoluminant pictures lack depth. 
Sometimes, to get higher-precision data on squishy cases 
I get  numerical  ratings of  grammaticality or meaning 
from sophomores, but it’s the same kind of  data, and the 
judgments and ratings always coincide. (In  fact, the F- 
ratios are often  in  the boos, so these  studies can get 
published in the psychology journals where they would 
otherwise reject anything that seemed too “linguistic.”) 
Generally the  linguistic judgments  are the most  infor- 
mation-rich data, but it’s also important to  bolster any 
conclusion by other means. That is because some pattern 
in a person’s judgments may not have been caused by  a 
rule of  grammar implemented in his brain but by some 
set of  individual cases  that  fossilized  in  the language 
centuries ago and have been memorized individually. 
Take the claim I am currently working on, that regular 
past  tense and plural  forms are usually assembled on- 
line by a mental rule, but irregular ones are retrieved or 
analogized  from  memory. You  begin  with  the simple 
observation that new verbs entering the language auto- 
matically get  regular  forms-fm,  fmed, fm’ng,  fmes. 
This suggests some rule that adds -ed  or -s,  but that is 
just  a  beginning,  the level of  detail  that  connectionist 
memory models can also handle. 
From linguistics, you can add a couple of  more subtle 
phenomena. Verbs based on noun roots can’t have past 
tenses listed with their roots in memory (nouns inher- 
ently don’t have past  tenses),  and they turn  out to  be 
always regular, even when  their  sound pattern  would 
seem to call out for an irregular form-henceflied  out 
and ringed the ciy, not flew out and rang the ciy. This 
confirms  that  the  process  creating regular  forms  is  a 
default operation that applies whenever memory doesn’t 
supply a form. Second, people accept mice-infested and 
men-bashing but not rats-infested and guys-bashing.  Say 
the compounding operation takes two words from mem- 
ory and glues them together. Mice and men are in mem- 
ory, because they are unpredictable,  whereas rats and 
guys are not, because  they can be  generated  by  rule 
when  needed.  Therefore the compounding  operation 
finds mice in lexical memory and can glue it to infested, 
but can’t find rats and has to use rat. 
Now go to the laboratory, and you can show that both 
these effects can be replicated in ratings by sophomores, 
and  in experiments where you elicit new words from 
preschool  children. Also, sophomores give low ratings 
and slow reaction times to low-frequency irregular forms 
such as sm’ve-strove  and unfamiliar-sounding ones such 
as n&t-nust (because of  their weak memory traces) but 
give high  ratings and quick reaction times to low-fre- 
quency regular forms such as stint-stinted  and unfamil- 
iar-sounding ones such asploamp~loamphed  (because 
they  don’t have to  be  retrieved  from memory, so  the 
weakness of  any memory trace is  irrelevant). Now look 
at naturalistic speech errors in children: kids overapply 
the regular  rule, saying things such as buyed, and the 
errors are not correlated either in time or over words 
with how many forms such as tied orfid  their parents 
use, suggesting that the  errors are rule products, not 
analogies from memory. 
Finally, go to the neuropsychology clinic. A postdoc in 
my  lab, Michael Ullman, has shown that patients  with 
memory  disorders  and  unimpaired  grammar, such as 
Alzheimer’s, are fine with regular verbs and with non- 
sense verbs such as wugged but often make errors on 
irregulars,  such  as wimmed. Patients  with  impaired 
grammar but  less impaired memory retrieval,  such  as 
Broca’s aphasics, have  trouble with  regular  verbs  and 
nonsense verbs, but less trouble with irregulars. The data 
of the linguist from everyday speech and the other kinds 
of data, at least in this case, fit together almost perfectly. 
More generally, Chomsky‘s argument for the innate- 
ness of  the language system is based on the discovery 
that there is information in people’s judgments of  words 
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children. To make the claim more precise and concrete, 
the psychologist Peter Gordon ran an experiment show- 
ing that preschoolers say mice-eaw but never ruts-eaw, 
even though one can estimate that they have never heard 
their parents use either kind of  construction and thus 
could not have learned the distinction from the input; it 
must have come from the way  their lexicons are inher- 
ently organized vis-i-vis their grammars. And  there are 
other kinds of  data  that  line up with  the claim from 
linguistic examples: children’s  precocity at mastering fine 
points of  grammar, even the  useless ones; various syn- 
dromes in  which severely retarded people have intact 
language; language universals that cannot be attributed 
to mere utility; the uniform grammatical sophistication 
across cultures and subcultures despite vast differences 
in other measures of  cultural sophistication;  and, perhaps 
most  interesting, cases where  children create a gram- 
matically more sophisticated language than the one they 
hear from their parents. 
JOCN:  And needless to say, I assume these kind of  anal- 
ysis work for all languages. They are not flukes of  English. 
SP: Most immediately, we find the family of  phenomena 
related to  regular and  irregular morphology in  other 
languages, such as French and Arabic. The best compar- 
ison is  German, because its statistics are completely dif- 
ferent from  English. Its  version  of  the  plural  -s  and 
participle -ed applies to a minor@ of  words, not a ma- 
jority; the majority of  words are irregular. But the suffixes 
show  almost the  entire set of  effects we  find  in  the 
English versions, quirks and all-the  frequency and sim- 
ilarity effects,  the  mice-infesredlrats-infested  effect, the 
fried out effect, about a dozen in all. This shows that the 
hallmarks of  a mental rule are not an epiphenomenon 
of the supposedly “rule-governed’ inflection being the 
majority of  cases in the child’s experience. They involve 
a qualitative difference in the way  that the brain com- 
putes a rule and the way it looks up items in memory. 
There’s no doubt that languages differ a lot. But I think 
the evidence is  that  the same kinds of  computational 
machinery are used  in  all of  them-the  division  into 
components, the kinds of  data structures used in each 
component such  as nouns and verbs and lexical and 
phrasal heads, and so on. Different languages use each 
of these gadgets to different extents, giving the appear- 
ance of  radical differences. For example, in many native 
American languages you can build an entire sentence out 
of a verb by sticking strings of  prefixes and sufies  onto 
it  that  specify key  properties of  the verb’s arguments, 
without having  to  select and place  a  bunch  of  noun 
phrases. It seems completely different from English. But 
then we have this silly little agreement rule-tbe girl eats 
versus the girk eut-that is essentially the same mecha- 
nism. The isn’t doing much in English; if it disappeared, 
no one would miss it. It’s computationally costly to use 
and even harder to  learn, but English children use  it 
correctly more than 90% of  the time by  the time they 
turn 4.  This suggests that the mental algorithms necessary 
for supposedly radically different languages are available 
to all humans. 
JOCN  Well, if  language is to be understood in this bi- 
ological sense, in how our species actually operates as 
opposed to how nineteenth-century grammarians would 
like us  to  speak and write, do you  see the  language 
cultists such as  William Safire as  Johnny-come-lately  tech- 
nologists?  I mean all of  us like sex in the biological sense, 
but some of  us are artists. 
SP: Yes, quite right. The guidelines for good style, stan- 
dardized “proper”  grammar, and so on, are at their best 
technological add-ons that help us use language for pur- 
poses that it was not designed for, basically, putting eso- 
teric thoughts on paper for the benefit of  strangers. It’s 
an important technology but it is quite different (and far 
less interesting) than the basic unconscious grammar that 
we  all use to put words together in ordinary conversa- 
tion. An  analogy might be the rules for an illegal defense 
in basketball compared to the motor control programs 
for bipedal locomotion. And at its worst, “proper”  gram- 
mar is just  plain dumb, like the screwball rules against 
hopefully, split infinitives, Everybody returned to their 
seats, and so on. 
Actually, the so-called “language mavens”  such as Safire 
are more like witchdoctors than technologists. Like many 
linguists, I  am  always astounded at how ignorant they 
are about language. It’s not just that they don’t know this 
weeks version of  formal Chomslcyan theory; they can’t 
work through freshman problems of  grammatical anal- 
ysis (such as telling a verb from an adjective), and they 
have no knowledge of  the basic facts of  English-what 
kinds of  idioms and constructions there  are, and how 
they are used and pronounced. It comes from a general 
condescension about the speech of  the common person, 
which  they  consistently underestimate, and  ultimately 
from a nonscientific, uncurious attitude-like  many peo- 
ple, they are blase about unconscious mental processes 
that work most of  the time. 
JOCN  Do you  see language as a system separate and 
distinct from those brain processes that allow for com- 
plex thought? 
SP: To a large extent, yes. For one thing, the algorithms 
for grammar cut  across the  logic  of  conceptual cate- 
gories, as in the mice-eutm who eat mice differing from 
the rat-eaten who eat rats. Grammar is a communications 
protocol, not our knowledge database or our inference 
system. Moreover it is a protocol that has to interface the 
ear, the mouth, and the mind. So it’s no surprise that it 
doesn’t reflect any one of  them directly, but has a logic 
of  its own. Also, you find language and general intelli- 
gence dissociating in many populationsbeginning with 
toddlers, who are grammatical geniuses but incompetent 
at just about everything else. In Williams Syndrome, hy- 
drocephalus, and Alzheimer’s Disease, you can find intact 
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and in some cases of  aphasia and genetically transmitted 
language impairment you find the opposite. 
Of  course they cannot be completely separate. Lan- 
guage  has to  inferface with  the  conceptual world, so 
there has to be a level of semantic representation that is 
built  out of  the same kinds of  primitives as concepts. 
When  we  use language we  are engaging in  a kind of 
interpersonal interaction that must involve social reason- 
ing  processes. And  at  the lower neural levels I  surely 
wouldn’t expect language to use green neurons and com- 
plex thought to use red neurons or anything like that. 
JOCN:  Many scientists are now trying to understand the 
neural basis of  language. There are many new imaging 
techniques (PET, functional MR, ERPS)  and laboratories 
all over the world are studying language processes and 
looking for patterns of  cerebral activation. What is your 
opinion of  this work?  Are they asking the right question? 
Or  is  perhaps the  answer  to  how  the  brain  enables 
language to be found more in considering the properties 
of  local circuits? 
SP: Ultimately  the answer is  in the local circuitry that 
actually does the computing. Methods such as aphasiol- 
ogy and neuroimaging are a bit like using bomb craters 
and blurred satellite photos to  understand the long-dis- 
tance telephone network. But of  course the neural basis 
of  language has to  be studied at  many scales, and the 
neuroimaging methods are very exciting and important. 
The work to date is very intriguing and a good start, but 
when you  look closely at  the whole literature you  see 
some problems. David  Poeppel, a graduate student in 
our program, reviewed the three published studies that 
claimed to have found the areas involved in phonological 
processing. He found that the overlap in the three teams’ 
lists of  “phonology areas” was  zero! Poeppel found the 
same thing in his review of  studies that claimed to have 
found the areas involved in semantic processing-three 
completely  nonoverlapping lists  of  “semantic areas.’’ 
Even  more depressing, for both the semantics and the 
phonology areas, is that all of  the teams managed to cite 
studies in  the aphasiology literature that  they claimed 
were consistent with their PET finding. Obviously there 
are some bugs to be worked out. 
One of the problems is that none of  the teams studying 
“language processing” has included a linguist or psycho- 
linguist. Their models of  language processing just seem 
to  be made up on the spur of  the moment. So  they’ll 
have  some task  such as judging whether two  syllables 
end in  the same consonant as an example of  “phono- 
logical processing.” Now, any circuitry for phonology is 
going  to  be  doing  much  finer-grained analyses  than 
called for in that task-we  did not evolve a brain area to 
press  buttons  indicating whether  a  nonsense  syllable 
ends in  a consonant. The task surely involves a whole 
slew of  linguistic  and  cognitive processes other  than 
phonology, such as parsing  and remembering  words, 
perhaps orthographic recoding, and the overhead of  re- 
membering  the  task  and  generating  the  appropriate 
button-press. So it’s not  surprising that  the areas that 
light up after you subtract passive listening are not at all 
specific to phonology, and could show no overlap with 
the areas involved in the “phonology”  task in some other 
lab, which  might string together some other arbitrary 
collection of  procedures. Likewise in looking for seman- 
tic areas, a task such as generating a verb that goes with 
a noun just doesn’t correspond to any cohesive cognitive 
process, let alone being a test of  language. 
More generally, I wonder whether PET  research so far 
has taken the methods of  experimental psychology too 
seriously. In standard psychology we need to  have the 
subject do some task with  an externalizable yes-or-no 
answer so that we  have some reaction times and error 
rates to analyze-those  are our only data. But with neuro- 
imaging you’re looking at  the brain directly so you  lit- 
erally don’t need the button-press or the overt blurting. 
I wonder whether we can be more clever in figuring out 
how to get subjects to think certain kinds of  thoughts 
silently, without forcing them to do some arbitrary clas- 
sification task  as well.  I  suspect that  when  you  have 
people do some artificial task and look at  their brains, 
the strongest activity you’ll see is in the parts of  the brain 
that are responsible for doing artificial tasks. Still, it’s an 
intriguing beginning and like  most cognitive scientists 
I’m following it eagerly. 
JOCN  Well,  it  is  an exciting story and a  superb and 
fascinating book. I would like to conclude by asking your 
thoughts about how your studies of  language offer in- 
sights into mind design. 
SP: If language, the quintessential higher cognitive pro- 
cess, is an instinct, maybe the rest of  cognition is a bunch 
of  instincts too-complex circuits designed by  natural 
selection, each dedicated to solving a particular family of 
computational problems posed by  the ways  of  life  we 
adopted millions of  years ago. Aside from language, these 
might include systems for intuitive physics, biology, and 
psychology, mental maps, habitat, kinship, mating, dan- 
ger, food, disease, justice, friendship, and self-monitor- 
ing. This is very different from the standard conception 
of some nondescript but all-powerful “culture” from the 
social sciences, “information processing” from cognitive 
psychology, or “association cortex” from neuroscience, 
concepts that I suspect will go the way of  “protoplasm” 
in biology. But admittedly this is a big leap from irregular 
German participles. 
JOCN  Thank you. 
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